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Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001400010004-4

[Redacted]

5 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, NRO

SUBJECT : Contingency Planning for Project
OXCART

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1. I am glad to note in your memorandum of January 29 that it appears feasible to hold all OXCART-type vehicles at [Redacted] at least until January 1965. This will greatly assist in helping to avoid surfacing until an operational capability has been achieved, or until such decision may be taken by the President for other reasons.

2. In this connection, at a meeting held at the White House on November 29, 1963, with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the President decided not to surface at that time and to review the matter again in late January or early February.

/s/

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA

NRO review(s) completed.

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MSC:bec

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Deputy Director (Science & Technology)

3 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

SUBJECT: Contingency Planning for
Project OXCART

1. McMillan's memorandum of
29 January on contingency planning for
Project OXCART has one significant
quotation:

"....no decision to direct imple-
mentation will be taken without
the specific authorization from
the Secretary of Defense to surface
the R-12."

As the result of the event of Friday
last when McNamara attempted to do pre-
cisely this, I believe we now understand
what McMillan had in mind. Fubini's role
in the DOD ploy, I presume, became clear
in his telephone conversation with you.
I believe we must also assume that
McMillan was party to the affair.

2. Since we have laid down the law
to DOD on this matter, I propose that

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ALBERT D. WHEELON

you dictate a memorandum to McMillan setting him straight on this point by making quite explicit that it is the Director of Central Intelligence who will make the basic decision as to whether the OX vehicle will be surfaced. Certainly after the events of this past weekend we are only reiterating the position we have now made quite strongly.



Albert D. Wheelon

Attach:

Copy 1

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Remarks:

General Carter has read the attached and asked that it be sent to you for your study and comments. General Carter particularly noted the wording of the last sentence of the first paragraph.

STAT

H. Knoche

STAT

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